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Abstract 
This case note analyses the judgment delivered by the ECJ in R.O. v Minister for Justice and Equality (C-
327/18), which examines the possibility of executing European arrest warrants (EAW) issued by the UK 
after giving notice of its withdrawal according to art. 50 TEU. In this case, the Court prioritises the 
functioning of the EAW despite the uncertainty surrounding the fundamental rights and legal framework 
governing the relationship of this country with the EU after Brexit. This judgement is interesting as it 
clarifies issues such as whether mutual trust continues to apply to a Member State after triggering art. 50 
TEU or the implications of the loss of access to the ECJ for current EAWs. However, it also leaves many 
questions unanswered, such as what happens if the UK unilaterally modifies the rights assisting those 
surrendered prior to Brexit or what happens to EAWs which have not been executed before Brexit.  
 
Introduction 
On 19 September 2018, the European Court of Justice delivered its first judgment on Brexit.1 This ruling 
is the first of many others to come, including a very similar request for a preliminary judgment lodged by 
the Irish Supreme Court on 16 March 2018.2 In both cases, the Courts ask whether EU Member States 
are obliged to execute European arrest warrants (hereinafter “EAWs”) issued by the UK after this country 
has notified the Council of its intention to withdraw from the EU according to art. 50 TEU.  
The issues raised by the referring court, the High Court of Ireland, concern the tensions between the need 
to protect the fundamental rights of those surrendered prior to Brexit who are likely to serve prison 
sentences beyond Brexit day. The Court also touches upon the issue of the application of the principle of 
mutual trust that underpins all mutual recognition measures in the AFSJ. After the ECJ’s rulings in N.S. 
and M.E. and others that applies to asylum and immigration cases 3  and Aranyosi and Căldăraru 
concerning EU criminal law measures,4 it is clear that mutual trust is not equivalent to ‘blind trust’ and 
that the existence of a significant risk for the protection of fundamental rights in a Member State can 
trump the presumption of mutual trust.5    
 
1 R.O. v Minister for Justice and Equality (C-327/18) ECLI:EU:C:2018:733; [2018].  
2 K.N. v Minister for Justice and Equality (C-191/18) Order of the Court ECLI:EU:C:2018:38; [2018]. 
3 Joined Cases N. S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M. E. and Others v Refugee Applications 
Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (C-411/10 and C-493/10) ECLI:EU:C:2011:865; 
[2011]. 
4 Joined cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru (C-404/15 and C-659/15) ECLI:EU:C:2016:198; [2016]. 
5 On the nature of mutual trust and its analysis in Aranyosi and Căldăraru: G. Anagnostaras, “Mutual confidence is 
not blind trust! Fundamental rights protection and the execution of the European arrest warrant: Aranyosi and 
Caldararu” (2016) 53 C.M.L.R 1675; S. Gáspár-Szilágyi, “Joined Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru: Converging Human 
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In R.O. v Minister of Justice and Equality, the Court had to decide whether the announced withdrawal of 
the UK is enough to question the existence of mutual trust insofar as those surrendered to the UK will 
serve their sentences in an uncertain legal framework. The answer of the Court and the AG to this concerns 
is very clear: “mere notification by a Member State of its intention to withdraw from the European Union 
[…] does not have the consequence that, in the event that that Member State issues a European arrest 
warrant with respect to an individual, the executing Member State must refuse to execute that European 
arrest warrant or postpone its execution pending clarification of the law that will be applicable”. 6  
The goal of this short article is to analyse the impact of this decision on the operability of the EAW and 
on the relationship between the EU and the UK before Brexit day, during the transitional period, and 
afterwards. For this purpose, the first section will summarise the facts of the case while sections two and 
three will examine the Advocate General and the Court’s decisions. The last section will jointly analyse 
the different points raised by the Court and the Advocate General as they are virtually the same, their 
impact, and their applicability to similar situations in the time frame coming up to Brexit day.    
Facts of the case 
The UK issued two European arrest warrants against Mr R.O. for the purpose of conducting prosecutions 
for the charges of murder, arson, and rape on 27 January and 16 May 2016. Mr R.O. was then arrested in 
the Republic of Ireland on 3 February 2016, and he was put in pre-trial detention in Ireland while awaiting 
for the Court’s decision. Due to his ill health, his case could not be heard in Ireland until 27 July 2017. 
During his hearing, Mr R.O. objected to his surrender to the UK due to the withdrawal of the UK from 
the EU after the triggering of art. 50 TEU.7 He also alleged that his rights under art. 3 ECHR (art. 4 of the 
Charter) would be violated if the Court authorised his surrender to Northern Ireland and imprisoned in 
Maghaberry Prison due to the detention conditions in this centre. The Irish High Court initially considered 
that there were reports and information that gave rise to concerns about possible art. 3 ECHR violations, 
and requested additional information from the UK about the prison conditions that would apply to R.O. 
if surrendered to Northern Ireland.8 On 16 April 2018, the issuing Court sent supplementary documents 
explaining how the Northern Irish authorities would minimise the risk of R.O. being subjected to inhuman 
or degrading treatment, and the Irish High Court ruled against Mr R.O. on this issue.9 At this point, the 
only concern that the Court had to examine in order to decide on the surrender of Mr R.O. was whether 
 
Rights Standards, Mutual Trust and a New Ground for Postponing a European Arrest Warrant” (2016) 24 European 
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 197.  
6 See R.O. v Minister for Justice and Equality (C-327/18), Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court 
(Ireland) [2018], para 63. 
7 Minister for Justice and Equality v R.O [2017] High Court of Ireland 663, para. 15. 
8 Ibid, paras 53-61. 
9 Ibid, para 63.  
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the activation of art. 50 TEU and the withdrawal of the UK from the EU while the defendant is in prison 
has an impact on the execution of the EAW.  
This so-called “Brexit point” can be divided in different matters that arise after the UK’s withdrawal. 
First of all, Mr R.O. was concerned about whether the time served in pre-trial detention in Ireland would 
be deducted from his total sentence in the UK once art. 26 of the Framework Decision on the European 
arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (hereinafter “FD on the EAW”) no 
longer applies to the UK.10 He also questioned the applicability of the rule of speciality protected under 
art. 27 FD on the EAW according to which a person surrendered may not be prosecuted, sentenced, or 
otherwise deprived of his or her liberty other than that for which the person was surrendered. 11 
Additionally, he raised concerns about the uncertainty surrounding the rules that would govern possible 
extradition requests from third states once the UK is no longer part of the EU and about the human rights 
protections applicable once the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the rights associated to the FD on the 
EAW no longer apply.12  
Having heard the concerns raised by Mr R.O., the Irish High Court decided to refer three questions to the 
ECJ for a preliminary ruling by Order of 17 May 2018.13 Essentially, these questions concerned whether, 
in light of the uncertainty surrounding the future relationship between the UK and the EU in matters 
concerning EU criminal law, a Member State is required to reject the surrender of a person wanted by the 
UK. Furthermore, the Court asked for clarifications as to whether this should be the practice in all EAWs 
issued by the UK, in some of them, or in none. The High Court of Ireland also asked about the criteria 
that should be applied to decide whether the execution of an EAW is prohibited or should be postponed 
while awaiting for further clarity about the legal regime applicable after Brexit.14  
 
10 R.O. v Minister for Justice and Equality (n 1), para. 24.  
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid.  
13 R.O. v Minister for Justice and Equality (C-327/18), Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court 
(Ireland) (n 6).  
14 The questions asked by the Irish High Court are: ‘Is a requested Member State required by European Union Law 
to decline to surrender to the United Kingdom a person the subject of a European arrest warrant, whose surrender 
would otherwise be required under the national law of the Member State, 
(i) In all cases? (ii) In some cases, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case? (iii) In no cases? 
If the answer to Question 1 is that set out at (ii) what are the criteria or considerations which a court in the 
requested Member State must assess to determine whether surrender is prohibited? 
In the context of Question 2 is the court of the requested Member State required to postpone the final decision 
on the execution of the European arrest warrant to await greater clarity about the relevant legal regime which is 
to be put in place after the withdrawal of the relevant requesting Member State from the Union 
(i) in all cases? (ii) In some cases, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case? (iii) In no cases? 
If the answer to Question 3 is that set out at (ii) what are the criteria or considerations which a court in the 
requested Member State must assess to determine whether it is required to postpone the final decision on the 
execution of the European arrest warrant?’ 
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Virtually identical questions were referred by the Irish Supreme Court concerning the execution of 
another EAW on 12 March 2018,15 but this one has not been heard by the Court as it is being processed 
via the ordinary procedure because Mr K.N. is not being held in custody pending the decision of the 
ECJ.16  
What does Brexit mean? The Advocate General’s Point of View 
In a rather rhetorical Opinion, Advocate General Spuznar starts by acknowledging that little is known 
about the future relationship between the UK and the EU, but also claims that such uncertainty should 
not interfere with the execution of EAWs.17 As a consequence, EAWs issued by the UK should be 
executed in the same manner as before this country began the withdrawal process governed by art. 50 
TEU.18  
In order to answer the questions referred by the Irish Court, AG Spuznar divides his Opinion in four 
issues. He starts his analysis by reminding that the EAW and the principle of mutual recognition that 
underpins it are based on the principle of mutual trust between Member States.19 But AG Spuznar also 
acknowledges that mutual trust cannot be equated to ‘blind trust’, and examines the two-stage test set by 
the ECJ in the joined cases of Aranyosi and Căldăraru to assess the existence of a substantial risk to the 
rights protected by art. 4 of the Charter. After examining the basics of this test, AG Spuznar comes to the 
conclusion that this case does not fulfil the requirements of the first stage of the assessment as there is no 
systematic or generalised failure in the detention conditions of the issuing state that put the rights of Mr 
R.O. at risk.20  
Then, AG Spuznar goes on to examine the implications of the notification given by the UK pursuant to 
art. 50 TEU, and concludes that it would be arbitrary for the ECJ to treat this situation any different from 
that of an EAW issued before the UK notified the Council of the activation of art. 50. AG Spuznar 
considers that a unilateral suspension of the execution of EAWs due to the triggering of art. 50 would run 
counter to the literal meaning of the Framework Decision, which only authorises this solution “in the 
event of a serious and persistent breach by one of the Member States of the principles set out in Art. 6(1) 
TEU [now art. 2 TEU], determined by the Council pursuant to Article 7(1) TEU”.21  
Thirdly, he analyses the consequences of the non-applicability of certain rules derived from the FD on 
the EAW after Brexit. These issues concern the rule of speciality, the entitlement to credit from the time 
 
15 K.N. v Minister for Justice and Equality (C-191/18), Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court 
(Ireland) [2018] OJ C 190/9.  
16 K.N. v Minister for Justice and Equality (n 2).  
17 R.O. v Minister for Justice and Equality (C-327/18), Opinion of Advocate General Spuznar ECLI:EU:C:2018:644,; 
[2018] paras 1-2.  
18 Ibid, para. 2.  
19 Ibid, paras 38-42. 
20 Ibid, para. 44.  
21 Ibid, para. 55.  
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already served in pre-trial detention in Ireland, the prohibition of surrender to a third state, compliance 
with fundamental rights protections, and access to the ECJ after Brexit.22 With regard, to the loss of 
privileges emanating from the FD on the EAW (rule of speciality, prohibition of surrender to a third state, 
and credit for time already served), AG Spuznar claims that “Brexit means Brexit”, and that the rights 
and privileges stemming from EU law can no longer be invoked after a Member State withdraws from 
the EU.23 He does not consider this situation to question mutual trust or the automaticity of the surrender 
mechanism as he claims that this is the logical consequence of the UK’s the withdrawal.  
As to the protection of fundamental rights, AG Spuznar states that there is no basis to question the 
continuing commitment of the UK to fundamental rights or the rule of law because it will remain bound 
by the ECHR after withdrawal. In that regard, the AG introduces a new test applicable to Brexit situations, 
according to which the executing authorities will have to surrender the individuals if the requesting 
Member State is expected to abide by the same substantive rules that apply at the time of surrender, 
namely the international treaties and conventions protecting fundamental rights.24 AG Spuznar here fails 
to explain how this expectation is going to be measured or what is the evidence needed to question it.  
The last issue examined is the end of the jurisdiction of the ECJ following Brexit. He considers that the 
loss of access to the ECJ does not significantly imperils the protection of fundamental rights or the rule 
of law.25 In his analysis, he notes that before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, issues relating 
to third pillar measures did not have access to the Court, and this did not challenge the compromise of the 
EU or the individual Member States with fundamental rights and the rule of law.26 Although this is a valid 
point, AG Spuznar fails to acknowledge that access to the Court was one of the measures demanded in 
order to improve the fundamental rights concerns that arose from the implementation of the EAW in its 
early years.27 
AG Spuznar concludes that, while the future relationship of the UK with the EU is “terra incognita”, 
judicial cooperation with the UK has to be treated as “business as usual”.28 Despite this apparently 
contradictory statement, the AG sees no reason why the assessment carried out when executing EAWs 
issued by a Member State that has started a withdrawal process should be any different to that carried out 
in any other case.29  
 
22 Ibid, para. 57.  
23 Ibid, para. 59.  
24 Ibid, para. 70. 
25 Ibid, para. 75. 
26 Ibid. 
27 On the extension of the Court’s jurisdiction to third pillar measures: S. Peers,” Finally ‘Fit for Purpose’? The 
Treaty of Lisbon and the End of the Third Pillar Legal Order” (2008) 27 Yearbook of European Law 47. 
28 Ibid, para. 79. 
29 Ibid, para. 87.  
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Effectiveness and Mutual Trust Prevail: The Opinion of the Court  
The ECJ reproduces, to a large extent, the arguments put forward by AG Spuznar. It starts its analysis by 
acknowledging the importance of mutual trust and its impact on the execution of EAWs within the AFSJ. 
More particularly, the ECJ refers to L.M. v Minister for Justice and Equality, which dealt with the 
deficiencies in the Polish System of Justice and their impact on mutual trust and the execution of EAWs 
issued by Poland in order to highlight the exceptionality of the non-execution of EAWs.30  
Following the AG’s structure, but going a step forward, the Court examines two possibilities to refuse the 
execution of an EAW. In the first place, it looks into the possibility of a generalised disapplication of the 
FD on the EAW with regards to the UK. In this case, the ECJ following AG Spuznar’s Opinion rules that 
this solution would run counter to the literal meaning of the Framework Decision.31 In other words, the 
ECJ considers that accepting a unilateral suspension in the executions of the EAWs issued by the UK 
would violate recital 10 of the FD on the EAW, which establishes the conditions for this alternative.32 
Here, the Court refers to L.M. v Minister for Justice and Equality, in which the Court reminds that a 
general suspension of the surrender mechanism of the EAW requires that the European Council decides 
that there is a breach of the principles set out in art. 2 TEU according to the procedure of art. 7(1) TEU.33 
Without such decision, the activation of art. 50 cannot be considered sufficient grounds to unilaterally 
suspend the execution of EAWs issued by the UK.34  
The alternative to a general suspension of the surrender mechanism consists in acknowledging that, under 
exceptional circumstances, “limitations may be placed on the principles of mutual recognition and mutual 
trust between Member States”.35 To illustrate such exceptionality, the Court refers to the joined cases of 
Aranyosi and Căldăraru in which the Court introduced a two step test to determine whether there was a 
substantial risk of a violation of art. 4 rights.36 The Court also refers to L.M. v Minister for Justice and 
Equality, which extended the doctrine of Aranyosi and Căldăraru to potential breaches of art. 47 of the 
Charter.37 This judgment applied a similar two-stage test, but considered that the first leg of this test, 
which aims at assessing the existence of general or systematic deficiencies in the protections provided in 
the issuing Member States, is satisfied with the reasoned proposal addressed by the Commission to the 
Council on the basis of art. 7 TEU and the concerns expressed by a number of international and European 
 
30 R.O. v Minister for Justice and Equality (n 1), para. 35.  
31 Ibid, para 47; Case C-327/18 RO v Minister for Justice and Equality, Opinion of Advocate General Spuznar (n 17), 
para 55.  
32 Ibid.  
33 L.M. v Minister of Justice and Equality (C-216/18) ECLI:EU:C:2018:578; [2018], para 71.  
34 R.O. v Minister for Justice and Equality (n 1), paras 47-48.  
35 Ibid, para 39.  
36 Joined cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru (n 4), para 82. 
37 L.M. v Minister of Justice and Equality (n 33), para 44. 
7 
 
organisations.38 Then, the second step would require that the executing Court assesses whether there is a 
real risk that the individual sought for surrender will suffer an art. 47 violation due to the generalised 
fundamental rights deficiencies in the issuing state.39 
When applying this standard to R.O. v Minister of Justice and Equality, the Court considers that the 
withdrawal of the UK from the EU is not sufficient grounds to justify a generalised and systematic risk 
for the protection of fundamental rights.40 The basis for this assessment is that the UK remains party to 
the ECHR which is independent from membership to the EU. In this area, the Court forgets that 
withdrawal from the EU makes it easier for the UK to unilaterally withdraw from the Convention fulfilling 
a long-term promise of the Conservative party.41 The ECJ considers that this risk does not exist and that, 
since the UK is party to the ECHR and has incorporated it into UK law via the Human Rights Act 1998 
(hereinafter “the HRA”), the risk of modifying the fundamental rights protections applicable is minimal.  
With regard to the other questions, the Court adopts a different approach to the AG, and considers 
examining possible violations of the rule of speciality and its protection under art. 27 of the FD on the 
EAW unnecessary as there is “no evidence to suggest that legal proceedings on that subject are 
contemplated”.42 The Court applies a similar standard with regard to the prohibition of surrender to a third 
state under art. 28 FD on the EAW, and rules that the fact that both provisions have been incorporated 
into national law via the Extradition Act 2003 is a guarantee of future compliance.43 The ECJ also relies 
on the incorporation into national law of the obligation to deduct time already served in another Member 
State to deem this concern unsubstantiated.44 The Court regards this as a guarantee despite the possibility 
of repealing national legislation implementing EU law following the adoption of the European Union 
Withdrawal Act 2018. This issue is given no consideration in either the AG’s Opinion or the judgment.  
The last issue that the Court addresses is the loss of access to the ECJ. In this case, the Court reproduces 
the arguments posed by the AG when arguing that recourse to the ECJ was not possible before the Lisbon 
treaty and that the courts of the Member States were still interpreting and applying the Framework 
Decision.45 Additionally, the Court notes that, despite Brexit, individuals surrendered to the UK will be 
able to rely on the rights conferred by the FD on the EAW and the ECHR before a national Court.46 The 
 
38 Ibid, paras 61 and 69.  
39 Ibid, para. 60.  
40 R.O. v Minister for Justice and Equality (n 30), paras 51-52.  
41 On the relationship between the EU and the ECHR and the future of the former after Brexit: T. Lock, “Human 
Rights Law in the UK after Brexit” (2017) 1 Public Law 117; A. Williams, “The European Convention onHuman 
Rights, the EU and the UK: Confronting a Heresy” (2013) 24 The European Journal of International Law 1157.  
42 R.O. v Minister for Justice and Equality (n 30), para. 55. 
43 Ibid, para. 57. 
44 Ibid, para. 58.  
45 Ibid, para 60.  
46 Ibid.  
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reasoning of the Court presumes, again, that the UK is not going to unilaterally repeal or modify these 
compromises after Brexit.  
All in all, the Court is not satisfied that the notification of withdrawal under art. 50 is sufficient grounds 
for the non-execution of an EAW.47 The standard set by the Court to postpone or decline the surrender of 
an individual is the existence of “substantial grounds to believe that the person who is the subject of that 
European arrest warrant is at risk of being deprived of rights recognised by the Charter and the Framework 
Decision following the withdrawal from the European Union”.48 The Court deems the incorporation of 
most EU and ECHR safeguards into UK law as enough evidence to discount this risk and to determine 
that EAWs should continue being executed until, at least, Brexit day.49  
Commentary 
Does Brexit means business as usual?  
Overall, the approach of the Court favours the effectiveness of the EAW by allowing the continuation of 
one of the flagship measures of the AFSJ. The ECJ describes Brexit as an uncertain process that will put 
an end to the participation of this country in EU criminal law and policing measures while future 
arrangements between the two parties are, at the moment, uncertain. Nevertheless, it does not consider 
that this uncertainty impairs the execution of EAWs insofar as most of the current fundamental rights 
protections still apply.  
When deciding on the consequences of this uncertainty, the ECJ refers to the implementation of the ECHR 
and the FD on the EAW into British law via the HRA and the Extradition Act 2003 respectively. But, 
implicitly, it seems to be thinking of the European Union Withdrawal Act 2018, which ensures the 
incorporation of all EU legislation into UK law.50 The goal of this piece of legislation is to incorporate all 
EU law into the UK before Brexit day in order to avoid any uncertainty, giving time to the national 
legislator to modify or repeal retained EU legislation.51 So far, the UK has not started the process of 
repealing EU law (other than the Charter) and has not even clearly stated the EU legislation that will be 
kept and repealed.  
In the so-called “Chequers speech”, the Prime Minister stated that the UK will aim at keeping the EU as 
aligned as possible with EU legislation to facilitate future agreements and cooperation in the area of free 
 
47 Ibid, para. 61. 
48 Ibid, para. 62.  
49 Ibid, para. 61.  
50  On the European Union Withdrawal Act 2018: C. Pigott, “Making a new UK: Legislating for Brexit; a brief 
overview of the EU Withdrawal Act” (2018) 168 New Law Journal 16.  
51 On the Brexit process in the UK: P. Craig, “The Process: Brexit and the Anatomy of Article 50” in Federico Fabbrini 
(ed.), The Law & Politics of Brexit (OUP 2017).  
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movement of goods and services and in customs. 52  Similar compromises can be found in the 
Government’s White Paper on the Future Relationship between the UK and the EU, in which the UK 
Government reiterates its compromise with the ECHR and its willingness to maintain high fundamental 
rights’ standards post-Brexit.53 Arguably, future changes to the functioning of the EAW and fundamental 
rights’ safeguards will depend upon the bilateral negotiations with the EU. And any eventual change to 
this regard should modify the assessment of the Court as it will no longer be able to rely on mutual trust 
if the UK unilaterally modifies the legal framework applicable . Such changes, if announced soon, should 
impact on the Court’s decision in K.N. v Minister for Justice and Equality. 
What Fundamental Rights Standards?  
Besides the so-called “Brexit Point”, this judgment is very interesting insofar as it summarises the tests 
available to reverse the presumption of mutual trust that underpins mutual recognition in the field of EU 
criminal law. In the first place, both AG Spuznar and the Court talk about the possibility of a unilateral 
suspension of the EAW according recital 10 of the FD on the EAW, which is the only provision that 
authorises a full suspension of the FD on the EAW.  
But the Court also accepts the suspension or postponement of the execution of EAWs in cases in which 
there is a situation of general and systematic deficiencies in the system of protection of fundamental rights 
(first stage of the test) and the rights of the person sought will be at risk as a consequence of such 
deficiencies (second stage of the test).54 This assessment was set by the Court in Aranyosi and Căldăraru 
and recovered in L.M. v Minister of Justice and Equality when examining the issue of the deficiencies in 
the Polish judicial system and their impact on the right to a fair trial. After this, the Court chose to re-
apply it to this case in relation with the protection of fundamental rights after Brexit. What these 
judgments clarify is that this two-stage test and the possibility of non-execution of an EAW extends to 
non-absolute rights, such as the right to a fair trial, which answers some of the questions raised by 
Aranyosi and Căldăraru, when the Court limited its ruling to violations of absolute rights.55 In other 
 
52  See Statement from HM Government delivered on 6 July 2018 at Chequers. Available online at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/723460/CH
EQUERS_STATEMENT_-_FINAL.PDF  
53 HM Government, White Paper on the Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union 
(July 2018), para 2.3.19. Available online at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/725288/Th
e_future_relationship_between_the_United_Kingdom_and_the_European_Union.pdf. A critical analysis of this 
document can be found in: E. Baker, “Criminal Justice and the “New, Deep and Special Partnership” between the 
EU and the UK: A Critical Test for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice?” (2018) 26 European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 1. 
54 Joined Cases Căldăraru and Aranyosi (n 36), paras 89-92. 
55 On the consequences of Căldăraru and Aranyosi: Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi, ‘Joined Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru: 
Converging Human Rights Standards, Mutual Trust and a New Ground for Postponing a European Arrest Warrant’ 
(2016) 24 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 194, 219.    
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words, this judgment implies that, when the rights of the accused are at risk, this two-stage check has to 
be carried out regardless of the nature of such rights. 
Nonetheless, what this ruling does not clarify is what happens if the Court has sufficient evidence that the 
individual will be at risk of suffering a fundamental rights’ violation. This controversy stems from the 
lack of clarity as to whether this is only a ground for postponement or a ground for non-execution.56 
Aranyosi and Căldăraru seem to provide a ground for postponement rather than an absolute ground for 
refusal that will only bring the proceedings to an end if the “risk cannot be discounted within a reasonable 
time”.57 This means that if the executing authority receives sufficient evidence from the issuing Member 
State as to the protection of the defendant’s rights, then the execution of the EAW can be “re-started”.58 
The main problem with this mechanism, besides the problems that it generates with regards to legal 
certainty or the lack of clarity as to what “reasonable time” means, is that the reverse situation is not 
possible in the case of Brexit. In other words, the fact that the Court is satisfied with the UK keeping its 
fundamental rights protections until Brexit and some public declarations as to the Government’s 
compromise with EU fundamental rights cannot replace a mechanism whereby an EAW can be 
overturned if the UK decides to modify its protections unilaterally. This danger is even greater in the 
event of a no-deal scenario, in which the UK has less incentives to stay closely aligned with the EU in 
human rights.  
Did The Court Have Any Alternatives?  
The Court had a third alternative, namely the request of diplomatic assurances as a precondition for 
surrender, which was never explored. The issuing of assurances is a common practice in extradition 
proceedings and even in the functioning of the EAW as numerous Member States, including the UK, 
request them in their day-to-day practice.59 The goal of these guarantees is to ensure that the person 
surrendered will not be subject to conditions that will breach his or her human rights. These assurances 
can be used, for instance, to guarantee that the person surrendered will not be put in a prison that suffers 
from chronic overcrowding amounting to an art. 4 violation.60 The referring Court together with France 
and Germany considered in Aranyosi and Căldăraru that the request of additional guarantees regarding 
 
56 Ibid.  
57 Joined Cases Căldăraru and Aranyosi (n 36), para 104. 
58 Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi (n 55).  
59 On the issue of assurances in the EAW and extradition law: A. Izumo, “Diplomatic Assurances against Torture 
and Ill Treatment: European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence” (2010) 43 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 
233; M. Jones, “Lies, damned lies and diplomatic assurances: The misuse of diplomatic assurances in removal 
proceedings”(2006) 8 European Journal of Migration and Law 9. 
60 The use of assurances is common practice in the UK and it has been used in EAW cases to guarantee that the 
person surrender will not suffer the consequences of deficient prison conditions in, for instance, Elashmawy v Italy 
[2015] EWHC 28 (Admin). The criteria to assess these guarantees were set by the ECtHR in Othman (Abu Qatada) 
v United Kingdom [2012] 55 EHRR 1, 189. 
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prison conditions could be a solution to ensure the protection of the rights of the accused.61 Indeed, in this 
case, the ECJ ruled that the provision of assurances by the Member State is essential in order to discount 
the risk of possible fundamental rights’ violation during the second leg of the test.62  
Arguably, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU creates enough uncertainties about the future legal 
framework governing these surrenders so as to justify the request of assurances before granting a leave 
to all EAWs. But the Court overly relied on the fact that the UK has transposed all EU legislation into 
UK law, despite this offering no guarantees about the future protection of fundamental rights. The goal 
of this incorporation of EU law is to avoid the uncertainty that would be created by a blanket repeal of 
EU legislation on Brexit day, but the long-term aim is still to repeal some of these laws and replace them 
with UK legislation.63 This has already happened with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which the 
European Union Withdrawal Act 2018 repealed despite the efforts of some MPs.64  This should be 
considered as evidence that the withdrawal of the UK from the EU is not just a hypothesis or even a future 
event with uncertain consequences, but rather a future event with consequences that are already taking 
shape in the form of domestic legislation. Requesting, at least, assurances about the protections afforded 
to those surrendered after the UK has given notice of its intention to abandon the EU seems a minor 
inconvenience in order to guarantee the correct functioning of the EAW.  
The other key issue is mutual trust and whether this principle should continue to apply in relation with a 
Member State which is soon not going to be bound by EU law. The Court has repeatedly argued that this 
principle implies a presumption according to which Member States must be considered in compliance 
with EU law and fundamental rights unless exceptional circumstances apply.65 Although the UK remains 
part of the EU until 29 March 2019, it can hardly be argued that a compromise with EU rules and values 
characterises the present and future of the UK’s relationship with the EU. More precisely, the non-
incorporation of the Charter into UK law with the European Union Withdrawal Act 2018 is, at least, a 
sign that should be taken into account when analysing whether mutual trust in the shared values and 
fundamental rights still applies to the UK. Those supporting the repeal of the Charter may argue that once 
EU law is no longer part of the UK’s legal system, its retention is not justified insofar as it can only be 
applied when implementing EU law. This opinion is not unanimous and can be questioned, in particular, 
with reference to the interpretation and application of retained EU law that will still be applicable on 
Brexit day according to the UK Withdrawal Act 2018.66 
 
61 Pál Aranyosi (C-404/15), Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht in Bremen 
(Germany) lodged on 24 July 2015 [2015] OJ C 320/18.  
62 Joined cases Căldăraru and Aranyosi (n 36), para. 45.  
63 See C. Pigott (n 50).  
64 European Union Withdrawal Act 2018, S 5(4).  
65 L.M. v Minister for Justice and Equality (n 33), para 35; R.O. v Minister for Justice and Equality (n 30), para 34; 
Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v Achmea BV (C-284/16) ECLI:EU:C:2018:158; [2018], para 34.  
66 M. Bevington, We must protect our human rights from being eroded by Brexit (UK in a Changing Europe Blog 
2018); K. Ziegler and C. Saenz Perez, EU Bill: ‘supermaxing’ EU Law and reducing fundamental rights protections 
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On the other hand, this decision can be understood as a manifestation of the UK’s hostility towards the 
existence of human rights instruments of supranational origin. The UK has traditionally questioned the 
application of the ECHR, and has aimed at adopting a so-called “UK Bill of Rights” that would replace 
the HRA, the act of constitutional standing that introduced the ECHR into the UK legal framework.67 
Despite the stop put to this initiative, the UK Conservative Party has not given up on its promise to repeal 
the Human Rights Act; it has modified its timeline instead. Currently, the goal seems to be to first 
complete the withdrawal process from the EU and then, once the UK is no longer subject to EU law, 
withdraw from the ECHR as well.68 This solution would facilitate the negotiations with the UK, especially 
with regards to the situation of Northern Ireland and the maintenance of the Good Friday Agreement, 
which incorporates the ECHR as a safeguard to ensure that the agreement is upheld.69 Arguably, the  
withdrawal from the ECHR has become more complicated after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Miller has 
deemed the involvement of Parliament mandatory in order to denounce a treaty with constitutional 
standing.70 In that sense, the UK Government’s unilaterally denouncing the Convention, as proposed by 
the UK Conservative’s Party Manifesto, does not seem feasible. But as long as the UK has a majority in 
Parliament and there is sufficient agreement within the Conservative party, withdrawing from the 
Convention remains possible. In other words, although ”the rantings of an angry backbencher should not 
be enough evidence”71 when analysing the compromise of the UK with international human rights’ 
compromises, there are some issues that deserve a careful analysis. For instance, the withdrawal from the 
EU, the repeal of the Charter, and the reiterated promises of repealing the HRA should, at least, be taken 
into account when looking into the applicability of the principle of mutual trust.  
 
(UK in a Changing Europe 10 October 2017). Available online at http://ukandeu.ac.uk/eu-bill-supermaxing-eu-law-
and-reducing-fundamental-rights-protections/ Accessed on 7 November 2018; M. Elliot, A. Young, and S. Tierney, 
Human rights post Brexit: no simple solutions (UK in a Changing Europe 21 February 2018). Available online at 
http://ukandeu.ac.uk/human-rights-post-brexit-no-simple-solutions/  Accessed on 7 November 2018;.  
67 On the debate about the adoption of a UK Bill of Rights: P. Munce, “Profoundly Un-Conservative? David Cameron 
and the UK Bill of Rights Debate” (2012) 83 Political Quarterly 60; UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, A Bill of Rights for the UK? (2008).  
68 Conservative Party, The Conservative and Unionist Manifesto (2017), p 37: “We will not repeal or replace the 
Human Rights Act while the process of Brexit is underway but we will consider our human rights legal framework 
when the process of leaving the EU concludes”. 
69 See Good Friday Agreement (1998), Strand 1, para 5(b). 
70 See A. Peplow, Withdrawal from the ECHR after Miller – A Matter of Prerogative? (UK Constitutional Blog 28 
February 2017). Available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/02/28/alex-peplow-withdrawal-from-the-
echr-after-miller-a-matter-of-prerogative/  Accessed on 2 November 2018. 
71 S. Peers, Brexit means… No legal changes yet: the CJEU on the execution of European arrest warrants issued by 
the UK prior to Brexit Day (EU Law Analysis Blog 19 September 2018). Available online at 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/09/brexit-meansno-legal-changes-yet-cjeu.html Accessed on 1 October 
2018. 
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Conclusion 
With this judgment, the Court has avoided or, at least, delayed the chaos that a full halt in the execution 
of EAWs prior to Brexit day would create. The message seems clear: unless the UK unilaterally modifies 
its obligations before Brexit, EAWs will be executed as if nothing had happened.  
The Court also addressed the issue of fundamental rights and the compromise of the UK with the rule of 
law. In this sense, the ECJ did not consider the repeal of the Charter significant as the focus has been put 
on the compromise of the UK with human rights as a party to the ECHR. From a different point of view, 
this assumption is not at all unfounded insofar as the UK has opt-outs that cover several directives that 
develop ECHR rights and add protections, such as Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer 
in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings or Directive 2016/343/EU on the 
strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence. 72  In other words, most of the 
fundamental rights protections that apply to those surrendered under the EAW derive from the ECHR due 
to the exceptional position of the UK in European criminal law where it enjoys a blank opt-out and 
selective opt-ins.73  
Nevertheless, this judgment does not answer other questions. For instance, it does not address whether 
the UK would be able to keep these opt-outs if concluding a bilateral justice and police cooperation 
agreement, or if it would be required to comply with the full body of defence rights protections in order 
to secure a cooperation agreement with the EU. This would put the UK in a paradoxical situation, as 
Mitsilegas describes it, in which it would be forced to accept more EU law as an outsider than as an EU 
Member State.74 Other unanswered questions concern what will happen to all the EAWs issued before 
Brexit, on, or after Brexit day; how will the principle of mutual trust be assessed during the transitional 
period; or what is the announcement that needs to be made in order to consider that there is a systematic 
and generalised risk for the rights of those surrendered to the UK.  
The Court may solve some of these questions in K.M. v Minister of Justice and Equality, which is pending 
in front of the Court and will not be dealt with via the urgent procedure.75 If this case reaches the Court 
at all, it is very likely to do so after Brexit, and might provide interesting answers to all these questions. 
That is, if the Court considers that it still has jurisdiction over these disputes after Brexit or during the 
 
72 On the opt-outs in the field of EU criminal law: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Brexit- 
FAQ: EU Criminal Justice Rights in the UK (August 2017). Available online at 
https://www.biicl.org/documents/1712_faq_eu_criminal_justice_rights_in_the_uk.pdf?showdocument=1   
73 On the issue of the UK’s position in the AFSJ generally and, more specifically, in the field of EU criminal law see: 
V. Mitsilegas, “The uneasy relationship between the UK and European criminal law; from opt-outs to Brexit?” 
(2016) 8 Criminal Law Review 519. 
74 Ibid.  
75 K.M. v Minister of Justice and Equality (n 2).  
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transitional period, or if the UK and the EU decide that this will be the case via the agreement governing 
the transitional period or any other ad hoc agreement.  
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